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S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000174

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CSAF FOR GENERAL MOSELEY

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [MCA](#) [MOPS](#) [MASS](#) [IR](#) [AE](#)
SUBJECT: WELCOMING GENERAL MOSELEY BACK TO ABU DHABI

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 160 (SECRETARY WYNNE WITH MBZ)
B) ABU DHABI 159 (SCENE SETTER FOR ADMIRAL FALLON)

Classified by Charge d'Affaires Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

11. (S) General Moseley, your return visit to Abu Dhabi February 11-13 is most welcome, and we look forward to your conversation with Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) in particular. Your visit continues a series of senior level consultations with the UAE leadership, beginning with President Bush January 13-14 and followed up with Secretary of Energy Bodman (January 21-22), and SECDEF Wynne (Feb 3-5). We anticipate a visit from Admiral Fallon February 20-21 and look forward to two important Pol-Mil events in early March -- the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) March 11 and the Joint Military Commission (JMC) March 12-13. Each of these visits is an opportunity to renew our sense of mutual commitment and reinforce our collaboration.

Urgency on SEW

12. (S) In MbZ's February 3 meeting with Secretary Wynne, he pressed hard for progress on Shared Early Warning (SEW), citing it as his top priority. He was concerned that the USG was still waiting for other GCC states to sign on, when he would prefer to move ahead now with those willing to run quickly; he expressed impatience with Saudi Arabia and Qatar specifically. Underlying his sense of urgency was MbZ's characteristically energetic argument that he had to be ready to defend the UAE against Iran immediately. He also pressed for advance warning of U.S. intentions vis-a-vis Iran.

13. (S) The other chord MbZ struck with Secretary Wynne was his strong distaste for the extremists who have "hi-jacked" Islam for their unholy purposes. He insisted that they would not gain the upper hand in the region. MbZ's hate for those seeking to do the world (and the region) harm underpins his urgency about SEW and other aspects of close bilateral cooperation with the U.S. He will appreciate your thoughts on how to move SEW forward in urgent and practical steps.

Military ties focus somewhat on weapons releases

14. (S) You may wish to refer to our review of the status of overall military relations in a scene setter to Admiral Fallon (ref B), in which we characterize the strong

fundamentals of cooperation. We also offer a current perspective on MbZ's views on Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, issues on which he will certainly hope to engage you to some degree. In addition, MbZ will be urgent about the release to the UAE of key weapons systems, primarily those he hopes to field as part of a missile defense architecture with Iran in mind: THAAD, SL-AMRAAM, and Patriot PAC 3. The UAE submitted Letters of Request for these systems last year (with a total value reaching into the \$17 billion range). The UAE will see the speed of approval and delivery as a measure of USG willingness to stand by the UAE as a long term ally.

15. (S) The GSD talks on March 11 will be yet another opportunity for MbZ to press for progress on the weapons release front. Those talks were originally viewed on the U.S. side as evolving into something more regional in nature, yet to date their character remains bilateral in the case of the UAE. MbZ prefers the bilateral format because he sees other regional players as having slightly different needs, rather different policy approaches, and very different levels of enthusiasm to move quickly. He also sees potential delays in weapons releases to Saudi Arabia (potentially politicized in Congress) and wishes to keep the UAE package on a separate track.

16. (S) Other pending weapons sales include: High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS, case was signed and is being implemented now, valued at \$597M), short-term interest in purchasing three E2-C Hawkeye AEW&C aircraft (in LOA negotiations) as an interim solution until delivery of a more permanent AEW&C platform (decision expected in mid-2008), 40 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters for its Special Operations Command (UAE has signed and the case is being implemented, valued at \$807M), 10 Blackhawks via Direct Commercial Sales from Sikorsky, ongoing upgrade of AH-64 Apache helicopters to the "D" (LONGBOW) model, 1300 Hellfire missiles (with the expectation of a request for an additional 1200 missiles), and additional weapons for their F-16s (three Letters of Request have been received, valued at over \$800M).

MbZ appreciates engagement

17. (S) With his Air Force background, MbZ enjoys talking shop with you, one of his favored interlocutors, and we encourage you to pursue the conversation frankly. He seeks greater understanding of U.S. defense planning for an Iran contingency, a much quicker pace for SEW, and affirmation that his weapons needs will be fulfilled by his favored (but certainly not his only) military ally. You might also press him frankly on the fact that Iraq is showing promise on the security side and that we have not seen the UAE step in to help solidify those gains with more aggressive engagement. (Iraqis getting visas to the UAE is much too cumbersome, for example, and the UAE is taking a passive posture to facilitating a visit by PM al-Maliki.) Your relationship with MbZ is such that we encourage you to build upon prior conversations and draw him out somewhat on how Abu Dhabi views its regional role. You might also inquire about Abu Dhabi's recent agreement with the French to position naval assets and personnel here.

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